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ABSTRACT 
The Korean economy has evolved remarkably well for the last 60 years. Its performance 
has been admired and copied worldwide. But at the end of the 20th century, a crisis that 
apparently was not related to its economy, devastated the Korean model.  
This thesis focuses on the causes and consequences of the happenings during that time. 
The thesis will deal with the economic and governmental evolution of Korea until the 
1990s, the structure of the Asian crisis itself and the fall of Korea that was caused by it. 
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Corea y la crisis económica asiática. ¿Cambió Corea su modelo 
económico? 
La economía coreana ha tenido una evolución extraordinaria durante los últimos 60 
años. Su rendimiento ha sido admirado y copiado mundialmente. Pero en la última 
década del siglo XX, una crisis que aparentemente no estaba relacionada con su 
economía, devastó el modelo económico coreano. 
Esta tesis se centra en las causas y consecuencias de este acontecimiento. Para poder 
realizar el consiguiente análisis, la tesis examina la evolución de la economía coreana 
durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, la estructura interna de la crisis asiática,  el 
contagio de Corea y posterior hundimiento del país en ella. 
A través del seguimiento del desarrollo del modelo económico, el lector llega a 
comprender el porqué de la peculiaridad del sistema coreano. 
Una vez se llega a la década de los 90, el notorio declive se hace patente incluso antes 
de la llegada de la crisis al país, debido a la insostenibilidad de la estructura del modelo.  
La tesis concluye con un examen de las políticas llevadas a cabo por el gobierno para 
salir de la crisis y de esa manera adaptarse mejor al mundo globalizado actual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Palabras clave: Crisis económica asiática, economía coreana, chaebol, crisis financiera, riesgo 
moral, prudente regulación, reformas, asignación de recursos 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Korea has been considered one of the Asian economic miracles. It is obvious that the 
remarkable fast development of the country is a source of admiration and study.  Plenty 
of countries have been looking closely to the Korean economic model in order to acquire 
some of the secrets that makes it so unique.   
The effort of the private and public sectors to improve the initial conditions of the Korean 
economy are impressive. However, not everything is what it seems. 
By the last decade of the 21st century, Korea was one of the most promising countries.  
Its outstanding numbers in GDP growth, productivity and trade balance were considered 
by everyone as a sign of maturity and good economic performance. 
Nevertheless, the opacity of the business practices and the unusual relationship between 
Korean firms and foreign capital hindered the real facts about its efficiency. Therefore, 
nobody expected the Korean economy to be affected by market instability and mistrust. 
When the Asian bubble burst in the Southeast Asian countries, its economy looked 
sturdy and healthy.  
How come Korea was one of the most affected countries? Why did the whole model fall 
apart so quickly? Can it happen again? 
This work is an introduction to the practices implemented by different governments with 
the same target; the progress of Korea. 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of the Korean economy after 
the Korean civil war and to expose some of the reasons why the admired model was just 
a veneer. The thesis inquires its evolution until the recovery of Korea from the Asian 
economic crisis, which has been the most remarkable crisis that affected the Asian 
economy until today. The signs of an alteration in the course of the system after the crisis 
are appreciated today, but are they enough? Is there a real change in the established 
pattern?  
Therefore, the intention is to provide the reader with enough information in order to judge 
the strengths and weaknesses of this singular evolution and to ascertain if the system 
has significantly changed after the 1090s shock.    
The thesis is divided in 5 main parts: an introduction to the Asian Economic Crisis, the 
evolution of the Korean economy, the effect of the crisis in the Korean model and the 
conclusions. 
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In order to acquire all the necessary information to write this thesis, research has to be 
done on official documents from international institutions like the World Bank, the IMF 
and the Bank of Korea. In addition, the work from several recognized authors was 
consulted as well as reports, conferences and books. Therefore the methodology used 
to carry out this thesis is a mix between a qualitative and a quantitative analysis.  
There is a clear consent on what triggered the crisis in Korea but there are some 
divergences when dealing with the performance of the measures established to tackle 
the shocks.  
The study of the Korean system might be very profitable for developing countries. The 
Korean governance and its failures are highly valuable for states that are struggling with 
moral hazard and public-private resource allocation. 
Taking the singularity of the model in account, the Korean experience could be a waybill 
for those specialists trying to solve the puzzle of poverty, stagnation and poor natural 
resources. 
I would also like to point out that in order to deeply analyze the consequences of the 
political measures taken to heal the economy, it would be necessary to continue the 
research. Therefore, the conclusions extracted from the work accomplished are the 
outset of a deeper analysis to be done. Given the restrictions of time and size of the 
thesis, the work can’t be pursued until the end. Hence I would like to clarify that the 
results obtained might not be completely adjusted to the current reality of the Korean 
economy. 
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II. ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE ILLNESS OF THE TIGERS 
 
Asia is the world’s largest and most populated continent in the world.  
The Asian economic crisis that started in 1996 as a real estate problem of Thailand 
spread over several Asian countries during the late 90’s and cost billions of dollars to its 
economies. 
The crisis itself only lasted 3 years, from 1997 until the end of the millennium. The length 
of it shows the strong healing capacity of these markets and the flexibility to adopt painful 
policies. 
Even though not all the countries were deeply affected by the crisis, the entire region 
was touched by the shockwave that provoked market instability, negative expectations 
and fear of a market meltdown1.  Even satellite countries were negatively touched by the 
shaky situation and the interrelations between countries made the crisis go beyond Asian 
borders; Australia and New Zealand decreased exports due to the fact that Asia was one 
of its bigger export markets. Russia and Brazil had a bond crisis (Goldfajn, 2000), sub-
Saharan countries suffered from the decline in world commodity prices and a decline of 
the imports from East Asian countries. Specifically of metals, fuels, and agricultural raw 
materials, which are important exports from sub-Saharan countries (Calamitsis, 1998). 
But like in other international crises that took place before and after this one, the 
macroeconomic situation looked “fine”. No major advisements were made by 
international regulators, only after the entire financial system collapsed. 
 
GDP Growth annual rate. Selected countries. 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 See Annex 7.1 
Figure 1. Source: World Bank 
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2.1 Economic situation 
 
Diverse factors influenced the crisis, some with more intensity than others, but it is clear 
that it was the sum of various situations that lead to the fluctuation of the Thai baht 
without control. 
East and South East Asia is one of the most populated areas in the world. In the 90’s 
decade they had 25 % of the world output (Veneroso, 2002) , 50% of the world growth 
and almost two thirds of the world capital spending. 
In this context, several things occurred in a matter of years:  
China devaluated its currency in 1990 and 1994, the Yuan was the most undervalued 
major currency in the world. This worsened competitiveness and the exports shrunk. 
Due to an agreement with the American government, the Yen depreciated against the 
dollar, making South East exports even more expensive than the Japanese ones and 
losing more competitiveness on the way. 
Added to these financial readjustments, there was a decline in the semiconductor prices 
which affected all the technological companies, mostly located in this part of the world. 
With the new adversely scenario, Thailand was going to suffer from a major default. 
Net capital flows; Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. 1985- 2006 (US $ billions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure above shows the panic that predominated in the markets. The crisis was 
continuously fed back by bad expectations of economic performance and because of 
that no capital channeled into the economies. The most affected countries applied 
completely different economic policies and in the end, all of them emerged from the 
catastrophic scenario.  
Figure 2. Source: IMF Financial Statistics 
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A general sighting of the performance and the consequences of the crisis in the most 
affected economies is in need. Therefore, the Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian 
economies are mentioned specifically.  
 
2.2  The Thai fall 
 
Thailand was a very successful country in the region. With a continuous annual growth 
of 9%, there were high expectations on the Thai economy. 
On one hand, foreign investors were highly attracted by healthy internal conditions .The 
interest rates, policies of financial market deregulation, nominal exchange rate stability 
between 24.91- 25.59 Baht/Dollar, inflation rate between 3.36% and 5.7% and a trade 
surplus (Table 1). And on the other hand, the international complicated scenarios 
(stagflation of the Japanese economy, recession in the European economies). The 
combination of these macroeconomic conditions produced a pull factor towards foreign 
capital. Investors from overseas, started to invest massive volumes of capital in the 
economy.  
This fueled a bubble in real estate that affected the cash flow of the Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce (BBC), especially because of its borrowing from politicians that were not able 
– or willing – to pay back. Then, the BOT (Bank of Thailand) decided to intervene in order 
to avoid a major political scandal, and when it finally came out, the reputation of the BOT 
was severely damaged. 
The BOT, foreseeing a major problem with liquidity and cash flow, elevated the reserve 
requirements in all financial institutions. Stronger banks have higher reserves, which 
affect its profit and the money supply. 
Because of prior complications with the real state bubble, the Thai government decided 
to suspend the trading during one day of all financial institutions in the country. This 
policy was directed towards containing possible instability.  
The banks and finance companies couldn’t pass the test, and due to the biased licenses 
held by the Thai government there was concern that all the securities and finance 
companies would go bankrupt (Leightner, 2002).  
In this panicking scenario, there was a speculative attack against the Thai currency2 that 
created a severe credit crunch problem.  While the government promised to save some 
of the biggest financial institutions, the BOT spent 28 over 30 billion of its international 
reserves to defend the value of the Thai Baht in the international market. 
After realizing that the situation could not last longer because of the capability of the 
government to face the amount of foreign liabilities inside the economy, a switch in the 
policy was made; Thailand went into a flexible exchange rate system. The Thai baht 
                                               
2 See the annex 7.3  
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devaluated around 20% after the announcement and telephones were ringing all over 
the region. This was the beginning of the contagion. 
Table I. Selected Economic Indicators. Thai economy ( 1996 -2000)  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
  (Percent change) 
Real GDP Growth 5.9 -1.7 -10.2 4.2 4.5 to 5.0 
Consumer prices (period 
average) 
5.9 5.6 8.1 0.3 3.0 
      
  (Percent of GDP [minus sign signifies a deficit]) 
Central government 
balance 
1.9 -0.9 -2.4 -2.9 -3.0 
Current account balance -6.0 -7.9 -2.0 12.7 9.1 
  (In billions of U.S. dollars) 
External debt 90.5 93.4 86.2 76.0 67.8 
Sources: Thai authorities and IMF staff estimates. 
 
On July 28th 1997, the Thai government decided to call the IMF. With almost all its foreign 
reserves drained, the Asian country was in urgent need of capital. It required to renovate 
the confidence in its currency, therefore it demanded access to the IMF funds. Without 
the intervention of the reputed international agency, it was a matter of time the whole 
country might go bankrupt. The tendency of depreciation of the Thai Baht against the 
Dollar was continuing. The IMF intervened with a combined bailout of $ 20.9 billion 
between the institutions and some selected countries of the region. But the flow of capital 
came with strict economic measures to readjust the economic trend. 
Some of the measures were: 
 Increase taxes 
 Cut public spending 
 Privatize state owned businesses 
 Raise interest rates 
 Close illiquid financial institutions 
 
All of these measures were oriented towards a cooling of the overheated Thai economy. 
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2.3 Spreading over: Indonesia 
 
Other Asian countries, which were not pursuing the same policies as Thailand, suffered 
from massive attacks in their currencies, sinking their exchange rates and forcing them 
to go to IMF in order to maintain economic solvency.  
Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea were the three most affected countries in the 
region. Even though they were unwilling to be intervened by the IMF, the institution 
played a major role in order to safeguard a major default in the region.  
Indonesia was not suffering from macroeconomic rigidities. It had low inflation, trade 
surplus and foreign exchange reserves (Table 2). Although the structural weakness of 
its financial sector (Staff, 2000) and a large amount of short-term private sector external 
debt contributed to decrease government’s credibility  against possible liquidity shocks. 
Because of the first speculative attack, the Indonesian government widened the 
fluctuation range with unsuccessful results. After that, it started floating in Nov 1997 and 
depreciated by 30%.  
The continuing depreciation of the rupiah, worsened the situation drastically. The 
objectives pursued when the attack on the rupiah was being held were achieved; 
Indonesian companies rushed to buy dollars, thus putting more downward pressure on 
the rupiah and exacerbating  the companies' debt situation. Indonesian companies were 
going to have massive loses; therefore, securing themselves with a strong currency was 
thought to be the best solution back then.  
Figure 3. Source: World Bank 
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IMF and other Asian countries came to help Indonesia with around $ 45 billion, which 
were not enough to content the falling of the Rupiah. By 1998, 16 insolvent banks were 
closed and the Rupiah had fallen by 65%. Firm money control policies were settled in 
order to decrease inflation. Meanwhile population had to hoard food (figure 4) fearing 
deeper devaluations that wouldn’t allow them to buy any goods. 
The most prompt effect for the population of Indonesia was the accelerating inflation. 
During the first semester of 1997 Indonesia sustained a fairly low inflation rate (2.6%), 
but in the 6 following months, the inflation went up to 11%. By February 1998, Indonesia’s 
inflation rate was 20% and the estimated inflation for the upcoming year was ranged from 
50 % to 100%. 
Indonesia had to face a major political crisis, where a persistent regime was challenged 
on the streets for a new democratic order. By spring 1998 Jakarta suffered dreadful riots, 
which ended with one thousand people killed and thousands of buildings destroyed. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE II. Selected Economic Indicators of the Indonesian economy ( 1996-2000)  
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
  (Percent change) 
  
Real GDP Growth 8.2 1.9 -14.2 1.5 to 2.5 3 to 4 
Consumer prices (period average) 5.7 12.9 64.7 -0.6 5.4 
  (Percent of GDP [minus sign signifies a deficit]) 
Central government balance 1.2 -1.1 -2.2 -3.3 -4.8 
Current account balance -3.4 -0.9 4.4 3.1 1.9 
  (In billions of US dollars) 
External debt 127.4 135.0 149.9 147.6 149.1 
  (Percent of GDP) 
External debt 54.5 163.1 129.0 91.0 86.9 
Sources: Indonesian authorities and IMF staff estimates. 
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2.4  Other affected countries 
 
Malaysia Philippines and Japan were also affected, but their macroeconomic conditions 
allowed them to dodge the most dramatic phases of it.  
A particular case is Malaysia, where there main difference between was the way they 
addressed the situation. In the case of Philippines and Japan the contagion was repelled 
quickly by reinforcing the reliance of the investors in the countries.  
 
2.4.1 Special Case: Malaysia 
 
Malaysia had a stronger economy than Thailand and Indonesia (particularly in external 
debt, inflation and fiscal surplus) and was better off than South Korea in savings and 
equity/debt ratio. Also its banking system was healthier than the other countries. 
Unfortunately, this situation didn’t prevent its economy from falling into speculative 
attacks; the ringgit (national currency) shrunk from RM2.4/$1 to RM4.9/$1 and the net 
portfolio investment fell from RM 22 billion to negative RM 12.9 billion. (Goh)  
This provoked a crash of the stock market, massive firm bankrupts, the skyrocketing of 
the foreign debt and ended up with a banking crisis. 
Malaysia, like its neighbors, was at the edge of a massive default, so it decided to follow 
IMF prescriptions in order to face the crisis. It raised interest rates, the currency started 
to float, and it reduced public spending by 18%. 
After the implementation of these measures, the financial crisis developed to an 
economic crisis. The real economy contracted 14 %. Going in 1997 from positive GDP 
of 7.7 % to negative GDP of 6.7% in 1998. 
Figure 4. Source: World Bank 
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Due to the lack of effectiveness of the policies promoted by the IMF and the deteriorated 
situation, the government decided to leave aside the recommendations given by the 
international institution and change the strategy. 
Dr. Mahathir, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, created the National Economic Action 
Council for the purpose of centralizing all the economic decisions. He developed an 
alternative plan to improve Malaysia’s economy. The aim of the plan was to restructure 
the banking sector, stabilize the Ringgit, restore the market reliability, maintain financial 
market stability and invigorate the economy. 
Given the “trinity restriction”, the government decided to sacrifice the free capital mobility 
for the exchange rate stability and the monetary independence. 
First they reduced the interest rates gradually from 11% to 3%.  
Malaysia was an export country, with an open economy that based its performance on 
external trade (200% of GDP). Therefore, a stable currency is vital for a good 
development. Before the crisis, the national currency was traded offshore, this played a 
big role in the maintenance of the speculative attacks and the continuous devaluation of 
the Ringgit. 3 
Fearing a massive default from the exporting companies due to the continuous 
fluctuation of the Ringgit and the incapacity of paying back the loans, by September 
1998, Mahathir prohibited the offshore market trading of the Ringgit and gave depositors 
certain timeframe for repatriating their offshore deposits back to Malaysia. And the most 
important policy; Mahathir decided to fix the exchange rate of the Ringgit to RM 3.8 / $1 
( Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 During the crest of the crisis, the ringgit interest rate in Singapore soared from 20% to 40% a year, while onshore it was 
11%. 
Exchange rate Malaysian Ringgit / US $    (1995 -2000) 
 Figure 5. Source: World Bank 
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These measures were highly criticized by the IMF, especially the ones concerning the 
capital control and the one-year moratorium from the purchase date of shares on 
repatriation of proceeds from the sale of those shares. There were also some restraints 
to convert the ringgit to other currencies, except for trading. And the resident firms were 
banned from foreign loans unless their income was also in foreign currency. 
This last policy was designed to prevent currency mismatch, the major agent that 
boosted the Asian financial crisis.  
The policies executed by Mahathir were aimed to dissuade speculation with the currency 
and loans, restrict the power of the international capital markets in the real Malaysian 
economy and prevent the flight of capital by local residents. Nonetheless taking care of 
the export performance and facilitating the FDI4 were also major concerns for the 
government. 
The last package of measures was addressed to revive the economy and the short-term 
expectations through expansionary fiscal policy; an RM 2 billion package was released 
in 1997 that turned into a surplus of 2.5% of GDP in 1997, a deficit of 1.8% in 1998 and 
a 3.2% in 1999. 
The last policy pursued, after having the currency stabilized and the speculators far from 
Malaysia’s capital markets, was to restructure Malaysia’s financial system.  
As a consequence, it created a debt restructuring agency (Danaharta) to take over non-
performing loans from banks and supplied guarantee of banking deposits to not close 
down troubled financial institutions, fearing a deterioration of the situation.   
Later on, these measures deeply criticized, proved as a good medicine against the 
economic situation of Malaysia. Its current account balance went from a deficit of RM 17 
billion in 1997 to a positive RM 37 billion in 1998. 
2.4.2 Philippines and Japan 
 
Meanwhile Philippines had started an IMF-supported program aimed to adjust the 
macroeconomic situation of the country through a series of structural reforms in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s. This helped the country to overcome the crisis at a lower cost 
than other countries that were also hit by market panic. 
Other economies, like Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong had its currencies devaluated 
and their stock market deeply weakened. Major financial firms collapsed and the 
governments had to invest large sums of reserves to fight back; 
 Hong Kong's stock index falls 10.4% after it raises bank lending rates to 300% to fend 
off speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar. 
                                               
4 Foreign direct investment 
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Japan; In the beginning, the Japanese authorities were confident about the little impact 
of the crisis in their economy. However, more than half of the total foreign lending was in 
Japanese banks (Hill, 2000) . One of Japan's top 10 banks, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
Ltd., collapses under a pile of bad loans. Sanyo Securities Co. Ltd., the 7th largest 
Japanese stock brokerage firm, goes bankrupt with liabilities of more than $3 billion, and 
in the end, Japan announces that its economy is in a recession for the first time in 23 
years .Although Japan followed the same path as the other Asian countries, the troubles 
in Japan did have an effect on its economic situation. It significantly debilitated Japan’s 
ability to step in and take a lead role in solving the wider Asian catastrophe. Instead of 
Japan, the IMF, in conjunction with the United States, had to step in and stop the free 
fall in Asian stock markets and currencies. The credibility of Japan as a main source of 
stability in the region, and as an economic leader of the Asian economies, has been 
harshly ruined by its incapacity to take a leadership role in solving the crisis.   
All these major shocks in the economies affected to millions of workers that went 
unemployed5 (see Figure 7) created a major political crisis in Indonesia that lead to a 
change of regime and changed the political situation in South Korea. 
This new scenario was the one the lead Asia to the new millennium, waking it up from 
the dream of fast speed growth rate, uncontrolled financial and banking systems and 
little government ethic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 Especially white neck workers in Thailand and industrial workers in SK 
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Figure 6. Source: World Bank 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
 
The Republic of Korea (Korea, hereafter) has astonished the world with an average 
growth rate of 9% (Moosa, 1996) over the 30 years previous to the Asian Economic 
Crisis.  Its “economic miracle” hasn’t come alone and without sacrifice.  It is well-known 
how North- and South Korea were devastated after the desolating civil war that harried 
both of them. In this chapter, the Korean economic system is deeply observed in order 
to place the reader in the late 90’s with all the necessary information to analyze the 
impact of the crisis and the measures taken to palliate its effects. 
Growth rate of GDP. Selected countries (1970-1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above is an illustration of how Korea developed in the first 25 years of 
economic growth. Having a background as mentioned later, it is at least surprising how 
fast they developed certain areas of the economy. The comparison between Korea and 
these selected countries shows a fast growing economy that is also very vulnerable to 
external shocks (see decrease from 1975-1980) and at the same time is surprisingly fast 
to overcome instability .  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Source: Bank of Korea 
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3.1 Korea, extraordinary circumstances 
 
Korea is not an ordinary country and its entrance into the second half of the 20th century 
neither. After suffering from a colonial invasion during 35 years that resulted in a 
chaotically social situation, stagnation, poverty6 and the loss of the main exporting 
market7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the departure of the Japanese rulers, the peninsula of Korea suffered from a bloody 
civil war during 3 years that ended in the division of both Koreas. In this situation, Korea 
was left in 1953 with a rent per capita of $ 67 and a life expectancy at birth of 50 years. 
After the separation of the Korean peninsula, the Americans backed a moderate group 
of politicians in order to form a unified government through negotiation.  
 
 
 
                                               
6 Japanese intention was to develop agriculture in Korea in order to satisfy the increasing dependence on rice in Japan. 
Afterwards Japanese decided to increase the industry in order to prepare the new empire for being self-sufficient and for 
the foreseeing war. This didn’t mean that Korea was benefiting from this development taking place in his own land; Korean 
capital was just a 1.5% of the total capital spent (unfortunately almost all industrial enterprises were based in the north of 
the peninsula).  
But even if Japan developed a significant number of infrastructure, the political and intellectual power was held by the 
colonial society, which reduced the access to information and severely limited the positive impact of these improvements.  
7 More information about the Japanese rule of Korea is presented in the Annex.  
Production in Korea (1910 – 1940) 
      (Millions of Yen) 
Figure 8. Source: Governor-General of Korea (March 1944) 
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3.2 First steps after desolation.  
 
Korea welcomed the 1950s with a desolate civil war for 3 years that ended up with a 
ceasefire (which is not a peace treaty).8  
The first president of Korea was Syngman Rhee, a Ph.D. from Princeton that had been 
exiled in the US for a more than 41 years. 
Mr. Rhee lacked a domestic power base and had to cope with the complicated arduous 
task of re-developing economic institutions, re-assigning property rights and re-
establishing the external trade9 and foreign exchange regime (Lim., 2000) . 
He decided to implement a policy to attract capital and technology, given the fact that 
Korea had no natural resources (North Korea was richer in resources than the south) 
and no technology.  
Nevertheless his political situation was far from being stabilized, therefore he decided to 
create a series of alliances to secure his power. He used economic policies to gain 
supporters, to mobilize funds to finance elections and to improve his relationships with 
selected private companies. 
Through his privatization process, the reader will be able to understand how the mistakes 
of the Korean economic system were created from the beginning: 
The Japanese colonial times left in Korea industrial properties (SOE’s)10 that the 
government had to take. These firms could have been privatized through a competitive 
process in order to assure efficiency.  Rhee, however, decided to ignore all qualification 
standards and lowered the qualifications in order to permit the acquisition of these 
companies from interim plant managers. In return of this favor, generous contributions 
to Rhee’s Liberal party were made. 
A similar process was held in the privatization of banks. Rhee’s administration put the 
banks up for sale in 1954 but a series of qualifications were also set up11. Experts were 
concerned about the possibility of Industrial firms controlling financial institutions and 
creating a dangerous distortion of resource allocation. 
When no bids were able to meet the provisions, the government decided to relax them. 
Consequently, the fears of the experts became the reality. Industrial capitalists used their 
                                               
8 The fact that both Koreas didn’t sign a peace treaty had big consequences for the development of the countries in the 
XX century. It is explained later how psychosis and fear were used as political weapons to accomplish the desired policies. 
The enemy right above had a high impact in the society and was used by businessmen too in order to accelerate 
production to “be more prepared than the enemy”. 
9 During the Colonial time, most of North and South Korea’s export were directed to the Japanese Market. From 1910 to 
1944, 81.7% of imports came from Japan and 83.8% exports were sold in that market (Lim., 2000). 
10 State-owned enterprises 
11 There were a number of provisions set in order to ensure the separation of banking and commerce. 
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political connections to borrow money from banks in order to bid for them and gain their 
ownership. By 1957 all major financial institutions were owned by industrial capitalists. 
Sygnman Rhee was in position to exploit the geostrategic importance of Korea. He was 
aware that the US considered the country as an important strategic ally. Therefore, he 
controlled the imported grains12 and other goods. They were provided as aid by the US 
and he distributed them directly to government employees and selected manufacturers. 
Plunged in a concentrated economic system, government and big enterprises were in 
control of almost everything in the economy. 
 Korea’s economy was the typical developing country. It was based on big import-
substituting industrialization. The economic policy of Korea was the result of crony 
capitalism with little interest for economic development. 
 
3.3 Changing the course of history  
 
The Korean society couldn’t cope with this endless wave of corruption and on May 16th 
1961, after a series of riots, General Park Chung Hee made a coup d’état and became 
former president of the Republic of Korea for 18 years. 
General Park was very much concerned about the weakness of South Korea compared 
to North Korea. 13 Therefore, he decided to lead the nation to a future of economic 
development and modernization. His past14, though, played a big role in the policies he 
implemented at first. 
He created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) substituting in some tasks the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of International Affairs (Lim., 2000). 
The EPB had to develop economic plans for the next five years.  This new economic 
policymaking surprised everyone, especially businessmen who didn’t foresee what was 
coming afterwards. After centralizing the economic planning, the government accused 
important businessmen to have gained part of their fortune through political favors and 
corruption. 
The military regime confiscated their equity shares in commercial banks alleging tax 
evasion.  This measure facilitated the re-nationalization of banks, after the privatization 
committed by the predecessor.  Following the path of government control over every part 
of the economic system, General Park transferred the monetary authority from the Bank 
of Korea (BOK) to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and therefore the power of designating 
the monetary policy and the foreign exchange. 
                                               
12 Three-white industries: sugar, cotton and wheat flour 
13 In the 1960s, North Korea’s per capita income was estimated to be double that of South Korea. 
14 More information about the past of general Park Chung Hee can be found in the annex. 
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The government also banned all labor unions and created a national one called 
Federation of Korea Trade Unions (FKTU).  
Korea faced the 1960s with a lack of capital, industry and a much deteriorated foreign 
image. In this situation decided to set up a plan for accessing foreign capital, boosting 
the internal demand and re-industrializing the country. 
These 3 factors are also complementary, due to the fact that during the 1960s most of 
the developing countries were in the process of industrializing in order to compete into 
the yet-to-be globalized world. In order to have internal demand, the population needed 
to be employed. The Industry was the main source of jobs at that time, and for developing 
a strong industry network it was necessary to have capital.  
The first plan launched by the government (1962-1964) was based on exporting primary 
products and develop basic industries. This plan sought to help the improvement of the 
country through helping the industries, and they gave special emphasis to the textile 
branch.  
As a weak and aid-dependent state15, Korea had no choice but to follow what the US 
advised. It was more than alarmed when the new government decided to boost economy 
through “industry deepening”. These industries were the embryos of the companies 
known today as Chaebols16 . 
The US insisted in developing infrastructure and human capital as main factors of the 
economic recovering, as they obviously didn’t agree with the main fields of resource 
allocation.  
US Assistance to Korea (1950- 1979) 
 
Figure 9. Source: South Korea: From Aid Recipient to Donor.  USAID 
                                               
15 US aid was 52% of the supplemental budget 
16 See chapter 2.4 Chaebols 
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This graphic shows the major importance of the US aid-packages in the Korean 
economy.  From 1953 to 1963 it counted for an average of 69% of the total amount of 
imports. After 1973 the direct aid was cancelled and it remained a symbolic help in the 
military field and some public loans. 
Accepting the reality, Park’s government had to carry out a series of measures in order 
to stabilize the internal economy and to minimize the international criticism over his 
policies: 
- Macroeconomic reforms to stabilize economy (especially increasing inflation) 
- Share investment risk with the industries (repayment guarantees for foreign 
loans) 
- Incentives to export based on market results 
 
To promote exporting, the government decided to facilitate the path for the firms and 
devaluated the currency in 1963-1964. The won went from 180 per dollar to 255 per 
dollar.  
The main problem of South Korea was the lack of natural resources and the nationalism 
prevailing these days.  Korea was waking up after 30 years of colonialism that 
undermined the moral of the country and afterwards a bloody civil what that ended up 
with a division of the nation, many families broken and two destroyed countries. 
Therefore, there was much more concern about foreign direct investment. Korean firms  
were not keen on foreign capital having access to all the economic net, therefore they 
chose to rely on foreign loans;   they needed capital in order to develop all these gigantic 
economic plans that they were creating, but they didn’t want multinationals to be part of 
their project.  
This decision had its consequences. Nowadays, it might look very simple to rely on 
foreign loans in order to get capital, but in the 1960s it was not easy at all. 
Korean companies had no international credit and for them it was almost impossible to 
get loans with viable interest rates, so the government had to intervene.  
Through the re-nationalized banks, the government helped to solve the problem of 
information asymmetry and guaranteed the private-sector foreign borrowing. This was 
the beginning of the “Korean developing model”. 
The government, however, had an important position regarding the private sector, simply 
because it was their path to external capital. Hence, it decided to take some action in the 
process. All loans had to be authorized by the government in order to pass to the banks, 
and the government allocated them in priority order depending on the field of investment. 
A new hybrid system was created. One were the firms used the government to abide the 
market restrictions in order to get financial resources , and where the companies were 
governments employees that carried out the projects decided by Park’s administration. 
This win-win situation was a mix between state intervention and free market that tried to 
exploit the best of both in a doubtful moral hazard way. 
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May the reader rethink the situation that the companies were facing, with free access to 
credit, just restricted with a few constraints that were purely acceptable. This state of 
affairs put the firms in a very especial position; no risk.  While one may think that this is 
a good situation because of the “possible” amount of innovation that never occurs due 
to the lack of credit, the fact that a company has no risk-capital free can be very 
dangerous.  Unless there is a tight control over the final destination of the money, there 
is a big possibility that there are some deviations on the road. 
 The government, consequently, try to monitor the performance of the firms by checking 
their export efficiency.17  
The continuous promotion of exports leaded the government to create the Korea Trade 
Promotion Corporation in 1962, a partial import liberalization in order to provide the 
industries with cheaper row material and tax deductions. 
This obsession that park had over exports was embodied   in the monthly export 
promotion meetings that organized between his officials and the most important 
businessmen. These reunions became a place to discuss about new policies and 
solutions for struggles they were facing.   
This evolution must be located in that especial time and place. Korea is not an ordinary 
country.  When the average GDP was less than $100 per capita, Korea decided to rely 
on human capital. 
Coming from a deep tradition of Confucianism that reiterates the importance of 
education, Korea started an extreme race against illiteracy and poor education.  By 1960, 
19% of government’s budget was spent on education, primary school enrollment 
increased eight times and secondary school by 10 times (Tudor, 2012).18  In the job 
market there were continuous incentives to increase productivity .It was common to see 
nationalistic appealing posters encouraging them to “Beat Japan”. The country became 
an army of workers, working extra hours and 6 days per week in order to “help the 
country”, they had cheap and quality labor. 
The export-oriented policy helped the companies enter into the international market. 
Even if the government was supporting them in the financial field and they were 
performing well in the internal market, there were no guarantees for their success in the 
international field.  
Once they started exporting, it was noticeable the exports were well performing. Korea 
solved its structural problems; its cheap labor and facility to access credit compensated 
the lack of natural resources and previous technology. This resulted in a positive circle 
for Korea, given that the good image projected internationally enhanced its international 
credit ranking, more foreign investors were attracted to the Korean market. 
                                               
17 They directly monitored and market tested the export yield of the companies. 
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By 1965, the relations with Japan were normalized and Korea started exporting to one 
of its relevant markets (country-data, 2014), also some compensations for the damages 
suffered during the colonial regime were given to Korea and it smooth the relations 
between the neighboring countries. 
3.4 The Chaebols 
 
Before going further into the description of the evolution of the Korean economy, I find 
indispensable to introduce the reader to the concept of Chaebol. 
Chaebol is a very Korean way of doing business. They were first created observing the 
principals of the Japanese zaibatsu.19 
Following their main purpose, Chaebols are firms with a very high control-ownership 
disparity. There is a controlling shareholder (normally the founder) that monitors the 
company but in reality has a very small portion of the company (forming a controlling 
minority structure). In 80% of big companies, the largest and controlling shareholder or 
family members are among the top executives20. 
Even when professionals manage the firms, there are highly restricted. 
Notwithstanding their small equity ratio, they sustained control due to 2 factors: 
 Korean big firms have more disseminated ownership than those in the rest of 
East Asian countries.21 Due to the minimum 5% required to have any decision 
rights, most of these small shareholders couldn’t easily object the main decisions 
(Baliño, 1999). 
 
 Institutional stockholders did not interfere the Chaebol’s activity, although they 
controlled over 40% of the shares.  Banks – that were controlled by the 
government- usually owned 10% of the shares. Other financial institutions tended 
to held around 10% also. Nonfinancial institutions had more than 20% of the 
shares. Using the cross-holding or interlocking ownership,   the small groups 
were able to keep control of the corporation despite owning less than their 
counterparts in independent Chaebols.  The direct cross-holding where A owns 
B and B owns A is illegal, so the large conglomerates had to design complex, 
pyramidal interlocking ownership structures.   
 
  
In summary, Chaebols were the consequence of highly dispersed ownership, insufficient 
public surveillance, weak environment and a poor governance system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                               
19 Later evolving into keiretsu. 
20 Corporate governance and firm profitability 
21 More than 95% of all stockholders were small individual shareholders possessing less than 1% of total shares. 
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3.5 Strengthening in the Path  
 
This risk partnership resulted in a complete success with a high growth rate and a 
massive industrialization of the country (see table 3). Korea was already focused towards 
a successful road. 
Thereby, the second 5-year plan was executed. This plan, aimed to develop the industrial 
structure and improve building of import-substitution industries; steel, chemical and 
machinery. 
By the end of the 60’s Korea already stablished the base of its risk partnership, assuring 
this successful image with continuous increasing of foreign loans.22 Meanwhile the 
external debt kept amplifying.  
 
TABLE III. Korea’s external debt. Millions of US Dollars (1962-1968) 
Year External debt Percentage in the GNP 
1962 89 3.8 
1963 157 5.8 
1964 177 6.2 
1965 206 6.9 
1966 392  10.7 
1967 645 15.1 
1968 1199 22.9 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
During this period, the third five-year economic plan was delivered (1972 -1976) 
promoting a fast development in heavy and chemical industries that were export-
oriented. The new industries started to be located in the south of the peninsula, far from 
North Korea and also from Seoul, which proved to be a good economic stimulation for 
the southern regions and a source of new employment. 
Substantial success was achieved during the first and second economic plans, which led 
to an excessive amount of confidence in the system and a dangerously relaxed 
institutions. 
Domestic savings grew, the exports kept increasing significantly and inflation surpassed 
15% annual rate. 
This uncontrolled borrowing, lead to a complicated scenario where companies were not 
able to meet the foreign debt obligations .Therefore the state had to take over 30 firms 
in 1969. 
                                               
22 In the first five-year economic plan foreign capital accounted for 52.8% of total investment. And in the second five-year 
economic plan it counted for 39.4%. 
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After observing these signs, the IMF decided to intervene in order to prescribe some 
guidelines. The government objected to it, but when the Unites States considered the 
creation of additional loans upon acceptance, Korean government change its criterion. 
This reaction steered a monetary cool down in the market. It went from 52% of expansion 
in 1968 to 11% in 1970. The intense credit control provoked a big change in the financial 
scenario; banks were not able to relief firms with a high credit burden.  The only solution 
available for the companies was the curb market. 
Things got worse for exporting firms; a devaluation of 18% of the ₩ in 1971 and a 7% 
the year after complicated their already weak financial situation. The global slowdown 
affected Korea intensely. By 1971 several firms were on the edge of a bankruptcy, Korea 
had to face a systemic crisis. 
Park’s government decided to bail out the insolvent firms and created the Presidential 
Decree for Economic Stability and Growth on August 3, 197223. This Package featured 
a moratorium on the payment of all the firm’s debts on the curb market24 and rescheduled 
the bank loans at a lower interest rate. 
The complex situation was also used by firms to convert their short-term high interest 
into long-term ones.25 
At last, this policy was also supported by the Bank of Korea, which accepted liabilities 
from commercial banks.  
The government plan saved the immediate crush of the Korean financial sector and 
firms, but didn’t improve the situation (see table IV) .It just shifted the all the load towards 
the curb lenders and the regular citizens which had to bear an increasing inflation tax. 
Moreover, the owners and managers of the companies remained intact, obliging only 
curb lenders and citizens to face the consequences of the lack of responsibility held by 
the managers.  
Neither government officials took responsibility for the lack of surveillance that lead to 
the crisis. In the end, this desperate solution benefited the ones that carried the economy 
to the edge of a massive collapse. It showed that the government will do the necessary 
to make the save the economy, despite the terrible consequences that the taxpayers had 
to suffer. 
                                               
23 Commonly referred as “the August 3 Measure” 
24 The moratorium was to be endured during 3 years. After the stablished period, all loans had to be turned into 5-year 
loans with 1.35% monthly interest rate or 16.2% annual rate. 
After the bailout forced curb lenders and debtors to register with the government, it showed that 42% of total bank loans 
in the formal financial sector were curb loans. It evinced to what degree was the financial sector dependent on the curb 
market. 
25 Approximately 30% of the debts were converted with the concessional terms.  
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After the economic stabilized and started to recover, Park’s administration decided to 
open the family-owned firms to shareholders, in an attempt to disperse the ownership 
and set up professional and qualified managers.26 
Notwithstanding the efforts made by the state to improve the situation of the companies, 
it had to face the reluctance of entrepreneurs to share the ownership with people outside 
of the family. 
The tendency was still to rely on loans more than equity sharing.  
TABLE IV. Economic trends in Korea before and after the emergency decree of 1972 
 
YEAR GROWTH 
RATE OF 
INVESTMENT 
RATE OF 
INFLATION 
INTEREST 
RATE ON 
BANK LOANS 
INTEREST 
RATE ON 
CURB LOANS 
1965 19.3 5.8 18.5 58.92 
1966 84.0 14.6 26.0 58.68 
1967 25.2 15.9 26.0 56.52 
1968 52.3  16.1 25.8 56.04 
1969 45.1 15.5 24.5 51.36 
1970 11.3 15.5 24.0 50.16 
1971 24.9 12.5 23.0 46.44 
1972 3.7 16.7 17.7 39.00 
1973 40.7 13.6 15.5 33.24 
1974 30.2 30.5 15.5 40.56 
1975 24.9 25.2 15.5 47.88 
1976 77.1 21.3 16.1 40.47 
1977 43.1 16.6 15.0 38.07 
Source:  Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook and Financial Statements Analysis, 
various issues; Cho and Kim (1997) 
 
3.6 The peak of the Chaebol 
 
The 2nd five-year plan and the crisis of the 1972 altered the government economic 
policies towards large firm conglomerates. The ambition of the state to improve the HCI27 
led to a consolidation of the government-risk partnership. 
It was not infrequent for the firms to acquire new companies coming from the heavy and 
chemical industries, or even creating a specific department on its own. 
                                               
26 From the opening of the stock Exchange in 1956, only 66 enterprises went public.  From 1973 to 1979, more than 300 
firms decided to become public. 
27 Heavy and Chemical industries 
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This shift in the basic structure of the companies was mainly provoked by the extreme 
financial support held by the government.  
TABLE V. Chaebol’s value added as a share of GDP 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Top 5 3.5 3.8 4.7 5.1 8.2 8.1 - - 
Top 10 5.1 5.6 7.1 7.2 10.6 10.9 - - 
TOP 
20 
7.1 7.8 9.8 9.4 13.3 14.0 - - 
Source: SaKong (1993) 
 
The aspiring HCI drive conducted the firms to an intense-borrowing situation in order to 
expand their conglomerates. And at the same time, Park was worried about the lack of 
public companies. 
The contradictory picture created massive companies that became “too big to fail” and 
provoked a biased situation in favor of a deeper indebtedness.  
Other aspects of the economy were performing relatively well, such as the employment 
rate (3-4%) which was a consequence of the high industrialization and the dynamism of 
the markets. 
Not only Korean Chaebols were working inside Korea, but also they were expanding 
abroad and exporting their knowledge overseas. This was the case of the “Middle East 
Construction Boom” during the decade that helped firms to counteract the negative 
results of their good exports. 
 
3.7 Continuous growth 
 
By 1979, the government decided to call off the HCI program and stabilize the cool down 
the economy.  But there were a series of internal and external factors that complicated 
the scenario. The external factors were the second oil price shock, the increase in the 
world interest rates and a slowdown in world’s growth. The internal factors included the 
assassination of president Park Chung Hee, the social and political turmoil that followed 
and a disastrous harvest. 
The GDP started to decrease and a new military regime arrived to the government.  The 
new general in charge, Mr. Chun Doo Hwan prioritized the control of the inflation as one 
of the main goals; devaluation of the won, the end of the subsidies for the HCI and an 
austerity package imposed by the IMF. 
In this context, a group of experts that were advising the new transitional government 
suggested a change of course towards a more market oriented economy. They feared 
that no possible solutions were available regarding the risk-partnership model. 
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The dilemma was well-known by the technocrats; the government was forced to back up 
Chaebols in case they went bankrupt, since a massive failure would collapse the system. 
Therefore, the government was obliged to warrant the credibility and stability of the 
financial system and the Chaebols. At the same time, the knowledge of a government 
back up stimulated the firms to assume excessive hazard. This vicious circle where the 
state was trapped in, led to an uneven scenario with companies leading the economic 
system and a state following their decisions. 
The group of independent experts went further on their analysis and advocated a 
transition towards a market-oriented economy letting the market forces to operate freely 
in the Korean system and displaying some positive signs of credibility. They thought the 
managers and owners of the companies should held responsibility for their acts and 
decisions. The government, as well, should step back and stop intervening in their 
investment decisions. 
 
GDP of Korea (1974-1982)              Millions of US $ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent institutions should be established. Being them in charge of a restricted 
control of the operations and transactions happening in the Korean market. 
Finally the government would have to re-establish a new paper and focus on the 
maintenance of a free and non-biased market. Promoting the competence and 
controlling the concentration of the conglomerates would be a priority while re-defining 
the new rules. 
Figure 10. Source: World Bank 
 
 
Figure 11. Source: Bank of Korea 
 
Figure 12. Source; World Bank 
 
 
Figure 13. Source: Bank of Korea 
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What the experts highlighted was a complete manipulation of the system towards 
personal interest in the business sector; 
While during the 60’s the Korean firms struggled to raise some capital abroad and had 
to rely on the government in order to have a certain credibility, the machinery itself 
developed a series of interested economic players that used it for their personal 
purposes. 
By this time, nevertheless, the economy worked out alone without the need for a public 
intervention. The advantages supplied from the corporations to some politicians and 
bureaucrats made the coalition of the state-business risk partnership unbreakable. 
Growing from the very bowels of the system and making it more and more inefficient. 
Mr. Chun Doo Hwan initiated a triple reform: financial liberalization, company unionism 
and industrial rationalization. Nevertheless, the idea of a state-leadership was never put 
aside and all the reforms were made for strengthening both the economy and the firms. 
Therefore, the measures never seek a real promotion of competition, but a safer path for 
the companies to operate.  
After the shift in the policy, Chaebols followed with a modification of their financing 
behavior.  
 
3.8  Liberalization measures 
 
The first step was the re-privatization of the commercial banks. The bad experience of 
the 50’s was taken in account to formulate the procedures and the framework. The 
separation between banking and commerce was ensured due to the maximum of 5% 
ownership available for firms or individuals.  
Even after the dispersion of banking ownership, the state maintain its indirect control 
over the operations and resource allocation. The approval of new bank managers 
depended on the approval of the Ministry of Finance.    
The bank credit control was also revised in order to allow SME’s to gain more access to 
the loan system. The government also decided to monitor the share of Chaebols in any 
bank’s loans. These arrangements were settled in order to ameliorate the problem of 
loan concentration. 
Following an increasing demand for income re-distribution, equity and balance growth, 
the government decided to focus its efforts in sectors that were forgotten during the HCI’s 
period. Sectors such as agriculture, fishing and mining were granted with preference in 
credit assignment.  
The reduction of loans to large firms and the policy promoting to forbear from excessive 
diversification modified the relationship between large firms and the state.  
Their way of promoting the competition was based in the allowance of NBFI (Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions) to enter the market with no limits. However, since the government 
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allowed companies to own NBFI, the system evolved into a new strain of resource 
allocation. 
Although these measure may look as an important change in the system, the fact that 
there were no institutions to provide private remedy or even a deeper distension of the 
market forces and the state, provoked a perverse scenario where the government just 
place behavioral restrictions. 
Now only the financial system was still misfit to the international markets, but the foreign 
trade was suffering from it as well. 
The continuous obsession for a surplus trade balance led Korea to a serious of 
restrictions that were not accepted by the US. While the exports in the 1980’s counted 
for more than 30% of its GDP, Korea remained unfavorable of FDI. Significant barriers 
remained for imports, such as the ones that allowed Korea to not have a trade deficit 
with Japan. 
By 1987, Korea started a democratization process. General elections were held with little 
control over campaign financial and spending. Big firms financed the campaign for 
politicians from different parties, and consequently political connections with the 
Chaebols remained the same. 
Economic reforms inquired by the people were implemented by the new democratic 
governments, but they were mostly income distribution - oriented and only to cover the 
immediate demand of the general public. Not significant system-reforms were carried 
out. 
By the end of the decade, the Chaebols were even bigger and more dominant in the 
market than before. There was no room for competition from outside, the NBFI were 
controlled by private companies and a new relationship between politicians and private 
firms was created.   
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Total liabilities Financial and Business Sector. (1975- 1990)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9 The edge of the cliff 
 
By 1990, the evolved risk-partnership relationship turned out to be more colossal and 
dysfunctional than ever.  
In a world with a focus on globalization and seeking for clarity in the markets, Korea 
remained as a dark spot where resource allocation was still manipulated by the 
government. 
The state continued to control the licensing decisions and supplied implicit warranty on 
borrowing.  
On the other side, conglomerates kept donating to politicians and used the loans 
for   implemented ambitious investment plans without little concern for insolvency. 
Although it may look too late, in the beginning of the 1990’s capital account liberalization 
was considered an important asset. Therefore, by 1991, foreign –currency dominated 
bonds were deregulated. During the winter of 1992, the Korean stock market was 
exposed to foreign investors for the 28first time and by 1995, commercial loans by 
domestic firms were allowed.  
In contrast of the strict restriction that remained to enter in the Korean market, banks 
enjoyed comparatively major independency when borrowing from foreign creditors. No 
quantity regulation existed in short -term nor long-term borrow but the situation within 
both lends was highly different. The government discouraged long-term borrows by 
forcing the companies to reveal the purpose of the loan as a condition for its 
                                               
28 These policies created maturity mismatches and currency mismatches. 
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admissibleness. On the other hand, short-term borrow was seen as trade-regarded 
financing and required no further information.  Therefore, the government policy 
stimulated the use of short-term borrows to finance long-term projects. 
Therefore, the well- announced portfolio liberalization was partial and biased towards the 
continuation of the systemic rigidities already existing in the country.  
The decision of the government was deeply motivated by the fear of a new globalization 
wave entering to Korea. Koreans had still a nationalistic pride that didn’t allow them to 
look further beyond. The slight idea of Korean firms owned by foreign capital was 
something inconceivable. 
Hence, despite the rigidities that started to come up in the economy29, the alarms of 
weakness and excessive exposure of the companies, Korea prevailed in the idea 
conceived during the 60s and 70s.Although the scenario was absolutely different. 
Current Account Balance of Korea (1988 – 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Chaebols, used to rapid growth and with the idea of “too big to fail” continued their 
expansion and overinvestment (Kim, 2000). External borrowing reached one third of the 
GDP. Some of the investments made by the Chaebols turned out to be not very 
profitable.  
This situation, combined with a financial crisis that started in South-East Asia and a 
couple of external shocks that shook the Korean economy, exploded inside the country 
and provoked the biggest crisis in its history. 
                                               
29 By 1990, Korea’s account balance started to deteriorate, mainly because of the rising inflation, a 
recession in the world’s economy and the appreciation of the Korean Won.  
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IV. KOREA AND THE AEC 
 
In the beginning of the 90’s decade, Korea was seen as a successful country with an 
impressive economic history of overcoming complicated initial scenario and finally 
achieving a stable continuous development. The “Korean miracle” was an example for 
developing countries and their governments.  
The Korean economy was relatively stable and positive (see figure 14), except for the 
current account deficit (see Figure 13). It was one of the fastest growing economies, with 
a 7-9 % average growth rate, a 5 % inflation rate before the crisis, the ratio of foreign 
debt to GDP was less than 30%, one of the lowest among developing countries and the 
government’s budget was balanced. Even the IMF predicted that Korea was not going 
to become a victim of the Asian Economic Crisis (Kihwan, 2006). 
 
South Korea current Account.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
There were hidden factors not analyzed or partially covered by the government in order 
to maintain credibility and stability in the country. The available information was not 
correctly interpreted, therefore the crisis hit the economy unlike other strong economies 
of the region like Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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Comparison between the GDP growth rate of Korea and Taiwan. Selected years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If almost all the macroeconomic indicators were performing well, what caused the 
unexpected crisis in Korea? 
Even though there was a major currency crisis going on in South-East Asia, Korea could 
have avoid it, or just have been partially affected. However, the situation was completely 
different, therefore there were other factors involved in the failure. 
There were several causes of the crisis in Korea. The special circumstances that brought 
Korea to edge of a sovereign default are diverse, but important. In my opinion we can 
divide them in 2 main blocks: internal factors and external factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the variables are related to each other. The existence of one factor can provoke 
or modify the intensity of another one. This led to a vicious circle that ended up with 
Korea intervened by the IMF and the fall of the house of cards of its economic model. 
In order to better understand the impact of the crisis in the Korean economic model, it is 
important to deeply study all the different causes. 
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4.1 Internal Factors 
 
The internal factors are very important to understand why a foreign crisis affected the 
Korean economy so sharply. The structure of the relationship between financial markets 
and the real economy made it so easily for external shocks to invade the whole system. 
The risk-partnership was over. 
4.1.1 Rapid wage increase 
 
By the beginning of the 90’s, domestic wages increased faster than labor productivity 
(even higher than Hong Kong, China and Singapore). As a result, the companies started 
to reduce its competitiveness and the profits.  
Nominal wages increased at a rate of 16% per annum from 1987 to 1996, exceeding 
productivity growth of 11%. The labor market was full of rigidities (Lee, 1999). 
By the mid 90’s most of the exporting companies started to incur in operation deficits. 
TABLE VI. Hourly wage in the manufacturing sector and Per Capita Income   
                              (In US $) 
 HONG 
KONG 
JAPAN KOREA SINGAPORE TAIWAN US 
Hour wage        
1985 1,73 6,34 1,23 2,47 1,50 13,01 
1990  3,20 12,80 3,71 3,78 3,93 14,91 
1995 4,82 23,66 7,40 7,28 5,82 17,20 
Per capita 
income 
      
1995 22.990 39.640 9.700 26.730 12.293 26.980 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995. 
4.1.2 Asset inflation 
 
The ratio of total land value to GDP was relatively high compared to other countries. This 
led to an appreciation of the rental costs, rental income and consequently, the cost of 
living.30 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 This resulted in a big demand from the employees for a wage increase. 
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TABLE VII. Land Value to GDP ratio. 1994. 
COUNTRY TOTAL LAND VALUE/GDP 
FRANCE 0.9 
JAPAN 3.5 
KOREA 5.4 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.6 
UNITED STATES 0.7 
TAIWAN ( CHINA) 3.3 
Source: National Statistics Office 
The rising in real state meant that firm’s assets value increased artificially and it permitted 
them to cover the operational deficits. This modification in the final numbers of the 
companies allowed them to inquire more capital for investments. And as in every real 
state bubble, it extended the fast expansion of credit particularly from non-banking 
institutions.  
Hence, in spite of many years of loses and bad performance, conglomerates were still 
able to raise their debt/equity ratio even more. 
4.1.3 Shift towards non-tradable goods 
 
The export sector started to decrease, manufacture labor was becoming more 
expensive, while third sector labor – in some areas- didn’t have to be qualified and the 
labor unions were weak. The non-tradable goods had high profit-earning capacity despite 
low technology. Thus, firms moves from exporting to domestic-oriented markets and from 
tradable to non-tradable goods. 
The importance of the manufacture sector started to decline. Meantime, the service 
sector was expanding continuously, especially in wholesale, retail and entertainment 
sectors. 
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Manufacture, value added % to GDP.  Rep. of Korea (1985- 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Structural problems 
 
The structural problems that Korea’s economy had to face were an important cause of 
the deepness of the crisis. The problem was already in the country, it just needed a small 
shove to unchain it all.  
In the preceding chapter, we study the evolution of the economic system in Korea. It 
gives us a glimpse of the main causes of Korea’s financial structure in the 90’s. 
The Korean financial system includes 3 types of main financial institutions:  Specialized 
and development banks, commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. There is 
also the informal curb market.  
Commercial banks are almost half of the financial system. They were public until the 
banking privatization of the 70’s.There were 16 nationwide banks , 10 regional banks 
and a large amount of foreign banks .They employ both short-term and long-term 
borrowing, including leasing. 
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Commercial banking in highly concentrated. Regional banks were mainly stablished to 
help develop regional economies through small and medium enterprises.  Foreign banks 
have a very small impact in the economy due to a reduced market share. 
Commercial banks (until April 1998) were supervised by the OBS31 at the BOK. 
Development and specialized banks are partially or completely owned by the 
government. Created during the 50’s and 60’s in order to sustain big investments in 
strategic sectors, they are approximately 17% of the financial system institutions. The 
funding from development banks come mostly from government-guaranteed bonds. 
These assets are issued domestically and abroad. They were supervised (until April 
1998) by the MOFE.32 
NBFI’s are accounted for 30 % of the financial assets. There are 3 types of institutions: 
saving, investment33 and insurance companies.  
                                               
31 Office of Bank Supervision.  
32 Ministry of Finance and Economy. 
33 Investment institutions comprise: merchant Banks, investment trust companies and securities companies. 
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NFBI were owned 34 by Chaebols35. They became the main source of resource allocation 
for large conglomerates. Their loose restrictions allowed them to avoid control and 
supervision36 from the public institutions. 
Apart from these institutions, there is the curb market. It was mainly used by SME’s with 
little credit or individuals with limited access to main financial institutions. The curb 
market started to decrease from the 70’s when the first NBFI were launched and they 
went further down in the 1990s with the deregulation of interest rates.37 
By 1993 Korea was preparing itself to the accession in the OECD. Therefore, a series of 
financial measures were stablished to open up the market and deregulate the economy.  
The first step was to deregulate the interest rates on all loans, time deposits and a big 
proportion of bonds. Other measures were the introduction of auditors for some 
government bonds and the simplification of credit control.  Moreover, the government 
lost all control of private financial institutions through the suppression of commercial bank 
manager’s appointments.  
But this move couldn’t come alone. The deregulation of a system that has been over 
controlled and protected for decades must be carefully followed by the economic 
authorities in order to prevent deformities in the market due to its previous composition. 
Detailed attention and coordination from the different institutions should be held at all 
times. Especially when addressing a situation where capital flows and lending 
opportunities are more accessible. 
As mentioned before, there was a lack of a unified institution supervising the process; 
commercial banks were under the control of the OBS, specialized banks and NBFIs were 
under the authority of the MOFE. 
This absence of a united supervisory body created the appropriate situation for the 
development of risky practices among private institutions.   
Some of the dangerous behaviors carried out by these institutions were;  
 
 Provisions for loan losses in commercial banks always remained under the tax-
deductible 2 percent limit.  
 Short-term foreign borrowing rates were lower than long-term ones, therefore 
domestic banks started to employ external short-term funds to domestic long term 
loans. 
 
                                               
34 Directly or indirectly. 
35 See part 3.4 Chaebols 
36 Even though they were supervised by the MOFE, in reality the supervision was scarce. There was no asset 
classification, capital or provisioning rules. After 1998, merchant banks were supervised by the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC).  
37 Despite the difficulty to measure the real size of the curb market, the OCDE estimates that the size of the market in the 
mid 90’s was approx. 2- 5 percent. While during the 70’s, the curb market accounted for almost 30 % of the total loans of 
the financial sector. 
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South Korea’s external debt. (Selected years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.5 Poor governance 
 
The relationship between private sector and the Korean government has been unhealthy 
from the beginning. First covered by the need of improvement and development, Korean 
firms and the state needed each other reciprocally.  
There was little control and supervision from the US concerning Korean governance. The 
main purpose was to check the macroeconomic data and to ascertain the economic 
development.  
Therefore, the toxic relationship necessary for the start, continued and grew over the 
years until it became the cause of a major failure. 
Corruption and relationships of interest between public and private sector were created. 
The inefficiencies resulted in a poor control over the performance of the business. Risky 
practices were common among them, and it exponentially increased until developing a 
complex framework.  
The government demanded loans to be made on political rather than economic 
foundations, and hence much investment was unable to generate cash flows to meet 
debt repayment requirements. 
It kept working even after the change into a democracy. No prudential supervision was 
carried out and the influence of the private firms was underestimated by foreign actors. 
Therefore, no major institutions estimated the real situation of the Korean economy.  
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Indicators of Bank Balance Sheets & Asset quality.        (Year and value, %) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Capital/total 
Asset ratio 
6.77 6.13 5.68 4.78 4.26 2.99 2.82 
BIS Capital 
ratio 
11.18 11.0 10.62 9.33 9.14 7.04 8.23 
Non-
performing 
loan ratio 
7.1 7.4 5.8 5.2 4.1 6.0 7.4 
TABLE VIII. Source: Monthly Financial Statistics Bulletin. Feb 1999. Financial Supervisory 
Service. 
4.2 External Factors 
 
4.2.1 Appreciation of the US Dollar 
 
During the 90’s, most of the investment carried out in the Asia pacific region was based 
on the expectative of a weak dollar. The dollar was too attractive for investors to hold on.  
Nevertheless, from mid- 1995, a new monetary policy was implemented and it changed 
the course of events; the US $ started to appreciate.  
As the dollar strengthened, Korea’s exports started to suffer. The Korean Won was 
pegged to the American currency, unlike the Japanese Yen. For that reason, the Korean 
Won couldn’t depreciate as much as the yen.  Moreover, both countries produced similar 
goods for exports and competed directly in the international markets.  Hence, this 
depreciation didn’t benefit the Korean manufacture sector38 and provoked an increase in 
its trade deficit. 
Some large conglomerates suffered from financial difficulties around this time and non-
performing loans (NPLs) at Korean banks bluffly increased, thereby sinking the financial 
sturdiness of domestic banking institutions. 
There were other major consequences 39 that sometimes are underestimated or 
disregarded. The debilitation of the Japanese currency had another major effect for 
Korea; it drained the Japanese direct investment into East-Asian countries.  
Japan had dollar-denominated loans that increased in yen terms hen the American 
currency appreciated. As a consequence, the BIS40 ratio of banks in Japan fell, which 
forced them to recall loans from their clients in Japan and overseas (including Korea). 
                                               
38 It provoked the downfall of the profitability in the export investments. 
39 In particular, Korea. 
40 Bank’s financial strength. 
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This brought 2 consequences to the international markets: 
- An increasing commonness of rejection from the  Japanese banks to roll over 
their loans to both domestic and foreign clients  
 
- A rising friction on the foreign exchange reserves of the countries, including 
Korea, developing eventually into a credit crunch for the whole region. 
 
4.2.2 Semiconductor decline 
 
The semiconductor decline was the consequence of a bad industrial policy carried on by 
the Korean firms form more than 10 years.  
From the beginning of the 80s decade, China shifted its exports policy towards a more 
“open door policy”. The successive measures taken in order to unfold the economy were 
very successful and for more than 15 years China’s real GDP grew more than 10 % per 
annum. 
These growth had consequences for the neighboring countries, especially for Korea. By 
mid 80s Chinese firms were real competitors for Korean companies in textiles, apparel 
and electronics. Not only Korea was facing competition from China, but also from some 
ASEAN countries41 that were developing their industrial net. 
Evidently, this severe competition put more pressure on the Korean exports: more 
competitors that produce cheaper. It was not able to reduce costs like its competitors; it 
couldn’t lower wager or increase productivity. Therefore Korea had to adjust to the new 
scenario. 
Korea decided to modify its industrial structure and become more high-tech oriented 
(Lee, 1999). Korea invested a large amount of capital in the so-called “strategic 
industries” such as biochemical, automobiles and electronics. But the market was 
already been provided by Japanese industries. Korea had to face a dilemma, either to 
compete against Japan or to sell its products in the same market as China and the 
ASEAN countries. 
In 1996 the price of semiconductors fell by 80 % and it sharply sunk Korea’s trade 
balance. Semiconductors accounted for 20% of Korea’s exports by value. The decline in 
Korea’s terms of trade initiated in 1994 and kept on decreasing until the beginning of the 
crises. 
At the same time, there was a cyclical recession in the Asian region (especially Japan) 
that was associated with an oversupply of manufactured goods in international markets. 
The little flexibility to adapt to the new international economy scene, produced a declining 
in the external demand for Korean products. 
                                               
41 Particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.  
KOREA AND THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS:  DID KOREA CHANGE ITS ECONOMIC MODEL? 
47 
 
4.2.3 Instability 
 
While the uncertainty was already spreading over foreign investors, the currency crisis 
in Southeast Asian countries was intensifying. This early expanded over the region. 
 In October 1997, the contagion spread to Hong Kong in the form of a speculation attack 
on the currency and a severe fall in the stock market. Even though the currency attack 
failed, at the time it was not clear whether Hong Kong government authorities had the 
faculty to avoid the contagion from developing into an entire financial crisis. With Hong 
Kong in a very delicate situation, foreign creditors denied to roll over their loans to Korean 
financial institutions.  
The lack of credit forced the Korean government to use its limited foreign currency 
reserves to help Korean financial institutions refund their short-term obligations. As a 
result, a considerable large amount of the nation’s foreign reserves was advanced to the 
overseas branches of Korean banks. This quickly reduced the nation’s usable foreign 
reserves to a risky low level. 
 
4.3 The crisis in Korea 
 
The danger in Korea started to be foreseen during the summer of 1997. Kia, Korea’s 
third largest car company run out of cash and asked for an emergency bank loan to avoid 
bankruptcy. These incident was seen as a first symptom of a much bigger issue, and 
credit agencies started to downgrade the ratings of banks with large exposure to chaebol. 
This movement increased the cost of borrowing for banks, and forced them to tighten 
credit. As a consequence, the heavy indebted chaebols had even more difficulties to get 
additional funds.  
To prevent a major failure from Kia, by october 1997 the government took the company 
into public ownership. This decision resulted a major impact in the international markets. 
The nationalization of the car company implied the conversion of private sector debt into 
public sector debt.  
Standard & Poor’s promptly downgraded Korea’s debt, and the stock market lost 5.5% 
of its market value. 
The grade’s deterioration from Standard &Poor’s plunged the Korean Won. In order to 
protect the national currency, the BOK raised the interest rates to 12 %,more than double 
the inflation rate (Kihwan, 2006). Since the ₩ was pledge to the US$, the government 
was forced to sell dollars in order to maintain the exchange rate $1 = 1₩. Even when 
the Chinese Yuan and the Japanese Yen were depreciating and the currency crisis was 
already installed in Southeast Asian countries. The aim behind this measure was to allow 
chaebols and banks to pay back their loans in their currency, fearing that a depreciation 
of the Korean Won would lead to heavy indebted institutions to inmediate failure. 
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After the beginning of the turmoil and the currency crush in Thailand, creditors started to 
roll over their loans in order to reduce their credit exposure.  Due to their increasing 
problems to face short-term obligations, Korean banks turned towards the BOK for help.  
During October-November 1997, BOK sent US$ 20 billion of official reserves to the 
overseas branches of Korean banks that were in the edge of illiquidity (Baliño, 1999) 
The country run out of reserves rapidly. By 1st of November 1997 the BOK had $30 
billion, but two weeks after it only had $15 billion. 
Even after all the effort from the government, they couldn’t prevent the bubble from 
exploding. An outbreak of failures expanded through the chaebols,unable to meet their 
debt liabilities. 
With Korea facing immediate sovereign default, the outlook of an IMF led bailout of the 
country was being outright contemplated. On November 13th, the Korean government 
declared that it "did not need help from the IMF", apparently believing that it would be 
able to settle bilateral loans from the US and Japan. The result of this move was negative, 
and on November 17th, with the nation’s foreign exchange reserves almost drained, the 
Korean Central bank gave up its defense of the won. 
 The won immediately fell below $1=Krw1.000 exchange rate, and it kept dropping. On 
November 21st the now humiliated Korean government was obliged to reverse course 
and formally requested $20 billion in standby loans from the IMF. 
 
4.4 Solutions 
 
The country and the IMF formally signed an aid package of US $ 58.3 billion, subject to 
strict conditions including important structural reforms and macroeconomic control. 
The first emergency package was a US $ 21 billion. An extra package of US $ 14 billion 
was released by the Asian development Bank and the World Bank. 
After these 2 packages, United States Japan and other concerned countries contributed 
with extra US$23 billion. 
When the helping program was announced the IMF expected it to be enough to balance 
the macroeconomic numbers and therefore calm restlessness in the markets. 
IMF demanded the Korean government to pursue hard measures to retrieve the lost 
confidence. Some of the measures were a tight monetary policy, to prompt closure of 
insolvent financial institutions and to raise interests stoutly. 
The interest rate was raised from 12.3% in 1st December 1997 to 20.7% on 3rd December, 
and by 23rd December same year it had already increased until 30.1%.  
Consequently, the performance on 3-year corporate bonds ascended from 14 % before 
the crisis to 30%. And very short-term yields on 91- day went from 13 % to 40.8%.  
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The M3 was reduced from 16.3 % in November to 14 % at the end of the year 1997. 
Troubled financial institutions had to be restructured or closed. By 2nd December, nine 
insolvent merchant banks were forced to appoint a rehabilitation plan within 30 days.  
The banks that were not able to meet the standards were closed. The remaining banks 
were required to meet 4 % capital adequacy ratio of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) by March 1998.  
Commercial banks were required to meet 8% of BIS ratio by September 1998. 
Despite all these measure to reestablish reliance in Korea, the rollover ratio of short –
term debt considerably decreased (Lee, 1999) .  
Table IX. Rollover ratio of the 7th largest commercial banks in Korea.1997.  (%) 
 October 1997 November 1997 December 1997 
Rollover ratio 86.5 58.8 32.2 
 
The stock market kept falling and the currency continued depreciating against the dollar 
(1,150 US$ / ₩ to 2.000 US $ / ₩ at the end of the same month). 
The IMF was disconcerted because all of these measures were not effective towards 
changing the depressive tendency of the investors. 
By 24th December 1997, Korea faced immediate default. The IMF determined that the 
foreign commercial banks had to roll over their short-term credits. On January 16th the 
banks and the government agreed on a complete roll over of all short-term debts falling 
before April 1998. The solution was to convert US $ 24 billion from short-term debt into 
maturities between one to three years. 
Afterwards, the IMF enabled the Korean government to govern its own the economy. 
The newly elected President Daejung Kim (hereafter D.J. Kim), after taking office in 
February 1998 began the labor of leading the country out of the IMF ‘trusteeship’. D.J. 
Kim’s government decided to apply Keynesian measures in order to reactivate the 
economy. It shaped a new macroeconomic policy to stimulate domestic demand and 
prevent a worse economic collapse. 
 The IMF’s high interest rates and restrictive policies employed to assist the currency 
collapse had led to a sharp deflation.  
The IMF soon agreed on an increase of the budget deficit from an initially 1.7% of GDP 
to a 4% of GDP. 
 To finance the deficit the government issued eight trillion won ($6.12 billion) in bonds. 
Moreover the BOK was allowed to increase the money supply to lower interest rates, 
and the IMF-mandated fiscal targets were progressively loosened.  
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There was also a question whether lowering interest rates would successfully expand 
the total money supply. The intention of the financial reforms was to consolidate the 
governance in the financial sector to adequate itself more closely to international norms 
and to promote private capital to take an effort for bank recapitalization. 
Therefore the rehabilitation of banks was the most important element in the strategy for 
corporate financial restructuring. To facilitate the financial reform, the D.J. Kim 
government selected to consolidate and enhance the authority of the Financial 
Supervisory Committee (FSC), which was formally established in April 1998 as an 
integrated financial supervision body.  
Commercial and merchant banks and other financial institutions had been continuously 
controlled for the accomplishment of the restructuring plans and capital adequacy 
targets, as recommended at the 8% Bank of International Settlements (BIS).  
Korea had to a certain extent succeeded in reducing insolvent institutions or 
recapitalizing them. It involved a big collateral expenditure; by the end of the third quarter 
of 1998 the government had spent more than a half of the total budget of 64 trillion won 
(14% of GDP) that had been allocated to financial sector restructuring. 
Chaebols, one of the main reasons of the sinking of the real economy, were the main 
target. The objective, while reducing debt/equity ratios, excess capacity, and corporate 
governance at the enterprise level, was to improve the country’s industrial efficiency and 
international competitiveness.  
The first movement of the government was to deal separately with the top five Chaebols 
(Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo, and SK). Afterwards it continued with the more than 
sixty others42.  
The top five were basically the leaders in Korean industry (Kihwan, 2006) .They were 
more globalized in operations and much bigger in size with more access to external 
financing and an easier cash flow position.  
For the rest of the businesses, especially for small and medium-sized suppliers working 
with the main Chaebols, it was vital for the government to adopt more indulgent 
measures since, unlike the top five, they would be more harshly influenced by the credit 
crack.  
The top five were required to agree on the forthcoming of the financial and operational 
restructuring in order to satisfy the government-imposed targets for debt/equity ratios 
and other international norms. By the end of 2000 their total production units were to be 
reduced from 271 to 136. They had to reduce their debt-to-equity ratio from their previous 
400% to the 200% stablished by international norm. They were additionally demanded 
to raise their capital base by selling off assets and subsidiaries and issuing stocks 
overseas.  
                                               
42 More information about the structural reform taken by the government in the Annex 7.4 
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By 1999, signs of a recovery started to show up in the Korean economy. The GDP 
increased by 4.6 % in the first quarter of 1999 and by 9.8 % in the second quarter. 
By the end of 2002, the Korean Public Fund Oversight Committee (KPFOC), reported 
that there has been important restructuring in the financial sector. 
The total number of employees has been reduced by 40% (Keun Lee, 2005). The total 
ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) in total assets has been reduced from 8.3 % in 1999 
to 1.9 % in 2001. 
The BIS ratio has increased from 7.0 in 1997 to 10.5 in 2002.  
 
4.5 Consequences 
 
Despite the unavoidable consequences of instability in the economy and the successive 
financial institution’s closing, Korea performed well after the crisis. 
One of the reasons was the maintenance of the confidence in the banks; foreign 
investors continued to bet on Korea. Notwithstanding the serious restructuring of the 
financial sector, lenders maintained their capital. 
It is obvious that the Korea’s present position has been a consequence of broad 
structural reforms that were implemented after the previous financial crisis. 
The most important measures undertaken were related to: 
- Strengthening prudential regulations 
- Reducing moral hazard 
- Promoting capital account liberalization 
- Invigorate corporate governance of financial institutions 
- Fortify legal and regulatory infrastructure 
 
 These reforms strengthened Korea´s flexibility and resilience which are deeply 
important for a highly open economy in the era of globalization. 
Despite the changes in the structure and the measures taken, there is a social downside 
that sharply hit the country.  The unemployment rate went from 2% in 1996 to 6.8 % in 
1998. Youth was also affected, the rate of unemployment among young workers (20- 24 
years old) raised from 7.4% to 12 % by the end of 1997.the working conditions also 
worsen and the wage froze.43 
 Nowadays, we often hear that a crisis represents an opportunity. Korea is an example 
of a country that was truly able to utilize such an opportunity. A crucial fact is that Korea 
did not limit itself only to reforms of the affected financial sector. On the contrary, the 
                                               
43 A survey of 400 enterprises found out that 45 % of the firms imposed a freeze on new recruitment. 17% used early 
retirement and 14% resorted to a reduced number of working hours. The same survey disclosed that 45% of unions were 
willing to accept wage freeze if employers guaranteed job security. (Serrat, 2000) 
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country started to build a knowledge about open market economy and it has been 
successful to some extent. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Once called the Asian tiger, the Korean economy had a big challenge to face in the 90s 
due to the result of 30 years of poor governance and a private corruption. 
During the first 20 years of development, Korean decided to rely on the government as 
the main origin of resource allocation. It had control of capital and labor; therefore it was 
the main actor in the economy.  
 The Korean economic system was created for a specific purpose: helping develop a 
backwarded  economy.  
The procedure of the system was pretty biased, but it always resulted in a success. Even 
if the main purpose of the investments made was not achieved, or the efficiency was not 
as expected, the cheap labor compensated the lack of competitiveness of some 
industries. 
The structure of the Korean economy was highly opaque. The interrelation of private and 
public interests ended up in a huge framework of responsibilities that were not met by 
anyone. The moral hazard poses a serious challenge in terms of a well-functioning 
financial system. 
Different causes triggered the wellknown outcome , it is obvious that non of these facts 
would have created the crisis itself, but its accumulation lef to a spiral of hassles that 
almost swallowed the system itself. 
The Korean model, in spite of having accomplished great succes in the foregoing 
decades, has no theorical base behind. Therefore, it completely failed against the Anglo-
Saxon model when the crisis hit. 
The domino effect of the asian economic crisis and the internal situation of the Korean 
economy originated a series of shocks that plunged the real economy and the 
expectatives of foreign investors. 
It is important to underline that the crisis in Korea was a liquidity crisis due to important 
mismatches in short and long term loans. The weakness and high exposure of financial 
and corporate sectors were highly damaged when the capital account liberalization was 
implemented. 
The fast and unbalanced liberalization of the financial sector was a big mistake. A 
complete liberalization was needed in the sector. Instead of that, only short-terms were 
liberalized. The economic institutions should have realized the volatility of the products 
and that the partial opening was only creating uncontrolled mismatches in maturity and 
in currency. It is completely necessary to develop long-term capital markets.  
The policies implemented to help the exports were very biased towards a continuous 
expansion of the Korean industry, without taking in account future economic changes.  
The managed floating system hid current account and trade imbalances. The control 
over a currency led to speculative attacks when instability and fear rove the markets. 
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The modern environment of globalization enhances the need for flexibility. 
A reform process trends to involve tension between global standard and local ideas and 
interests. 
Transparency within the business practices and independent institutions is vital in order 
to maintain investor’s confidence in Korea and overseas. The law has to be applied; 
therefore responsibilities should be taken by managers when deciding strategic 
investments. The absence of it creates a critical confidence situation for international 
creditors. 
Stability is as well essential to maintain a permanent growth rate. And among the 
corporate sector, it is fundamental that the firms are given full freedom in their investment 
decision-making. 
Profitability has obtained significant progress since the crisis. The net profit to sales ratio 
of the average of the top 30 Chaebols increased from -0.8% in 1997 to 3.48%. This 
guideline entails that conglomerates are redirect their spotlight from sales or market 
share expansion to profitability or rate of returns. 
While the Korean economy should continue to grow with sharp investment, the firms 
have one of the lowest equity debt –equity ratio in the world (100%) (Keun Lee, 2005). 
The main target for the economy should be to pursue long term growth rather than short 
term profitability. So as to carry out this, the Korean government should focus on: 
 Creating jobs 
 Developing new markets 
 Impulse  new firms 
 
Once these 3 factors are achieved, The Korean economy would be one of the most 
successful actors in the world. 
As a matter of fact, the outcome obtained after this work is that the Korean economy did 
change after the Asian Economic Crisis, but the model didn’t disappear completely. The 
Korean model still remains in the economy, but under tight control and supervision. The 
Chaebol is still a reality in modern Korea, but the moral hazard is disappearing from the 
public sector.  
Regulation and policies to promote competition are being implemented. The financial 
sector is thoroughly observed and market liberalization it is one of the main targets of 
the new Korean governments. 
Finally, it is worth bringing out that despite its dramatic impact, the long run effects of the 
crisis may be somehow beneficial for Korea. To the extent that the crisis gives Asian 
countries an stimulus to reform their economic systems, and to stablish some much in 
need restructuring, they may arise from the experience not weaker, but more solid 
institutions and a greater ability to reach sustainable economic growth. 
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VII. ANNEX 
 
7.1 Timeline of the AEC 
 
1997 
 Early May - Japan hints that it might raise interest rates to defend the yen. The 
threat never materializes, but it shifts the perceptions of global investors who 
begin to sell Southeast Asian currencies and sets off a tumble both in 
currencies and local stock markets.  
 July 2 - After using $33 billion in foreign exchange, Thailand announces a 
managed float of the baht. The Philippines intervenes to defend its peso.  
 July 18 - IMF approves an extension of credit to the Philippines of $1.1 billion.  
 July 24 - Asian currencies fall dramatically. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
attacks "rogue speculators" and later points to financier George Soros.  
 Aug. 13-14 - The Indonesian rupiah comes under severe pressure. Indonesia 
abolishes its system of managing its exchange rate through the use of a band.  
 Aug. 20 - IMF announces $17.2 billion support package for Thailand with $3.9 
billion from the IMF.  
 Aug. 28 - Asian stock markets plunge. The Philippines stock market decreases 
down 9.3%, and in Jakarta 4.5%.  
 Sep. 4 - The peso, Malaysian ringgit, and rupiah continue to fall.  
 Sep. 20 - Mahathir tells delegates to the IMF/World Bank annual conference in 
Hong Kong that currency trading is immoral and should be stopped.  
 Sep. 21 - George Soros says, "Dr Mahathir is a menace to his own country."  
 Oct. 8 - Rupiah hits a low; Indonesia says it will seek IMF assistance.  
 Oct. 14 - Thailand announces a package to strengthen its financial sector.  
 Oct. 20-23 - The Hong Kong dollar comes under speculative attack; Hong Kong 
aggressively defends its currency. The Hong Kong stock market drops, while 
Wall Street and other stock markets also take severe hits.  
 Oct. 28+ - The value of the Korean won drops as investors sell Korean stocks.  
 Nov. 5 - The IMF announces a stabilization package of about $40 billion for 
Indonesia. The United States pledges a standby credit of $3 billion.  
 Nov. 3-24 - Japanese brokerage firm (Sanyo Securities), largest securities firm 
(Yamaichi Securities), and 10* largest bank (Hokkaido Takushoku) collapse.  
 Nov. 21 - South Korea announces that it will seek IMF support.  
 Nov 25 - At the APEC Summit, leaders of the 18 Asia Pacific economies 
endorse a framework to cope with financial crises.  
 Dec 5 - Malaysia imposes tough reforms to reduce its balance of payments 
deficit.  
 Dec 3 - Korea and IMF agree on $57 billion support package.  
 Dec 18 - Koreans elect opposition leader Kim, Dae-jung as new President.  
 Dec 25 - IMF and others provide $10 billion in loans to South Korea.  
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1998 
 Jan 6 - Indonesia unveils new budget that does not appear to meet IMF austerity 
conditions. Value of rupiah drops.  
 Jan 8 - IMF and S. Korea agree to a 90-day rollover of short-term debt.  
 Jan 12 - Peregrine Investments Holdings of Hong Kong collapses. Japan 
discloses that its banks carry about $580 billion in bad or questionable loans.  
 Jan 15 - IMF and Indonesia sign an agreement strengthening economic reforms.  
 Jan 29 - South Korea and 13 international banks agree to convert $24 billion in 
short-term debt, due in March 1998, into government-backed loans.  
 Jan 31 - South Korea orders 10 of 14 ailing merchant banks to close.  
 Feb 2- The sense of crisis in Asia ebbs. Stock markets continue their recovery.  
Source: CRS Report. The 1997-1998 Asian Economic Crisis 
 
7.2 Chronology of Korea’s political situation 
1945 - After World War II, Japanese occupation ends with Soviet troops occupying area 
north of the 38th parallel, and US troops in the south. 
1948 - Republic of Korea proclaimed.  
The Korean War (1950-1953) killed at least 2.5 million people. It pitted the North - backed 
by Chinese forces - against the South, supported militarily by the United Nations  
1950 - South declares independence, sparking North Korean invasion.  
1953 - Armistice ends Korean War, which has cost two million lives.  
1950s - South sustained by crucial US military, economic and political support.  
1960 - President Syngman Ree steps down after student protests against electoral fraud.  
New constitution forms Second Republic, but political freedom remains limited.  
1961 - Military coup puts General Park Chung-Hee in power.  
1963 - General Park restores some political freedom and proclaims Third Republic. Major 
program of industrial development begins.  
1972 - Martial law. Park increases his powers with constitutional changes.  
After secret North-South talks, both sides seek to develop dialogue aimed at unification. 
1979 - Park assassinated. General Chun Doo-hwan assumes power.  
1980 - Martial law declared after student demonstrations. In the city of Gwangju 
(Kwangju) at least 200 killed by the army, causing resentment that has yet to fade. Fifth 
republic and new constitution.  
1981 - Chun indirectly elected to a seven year term. Martial law ends, but government 
continues to have strong powers to prevent dissent.  
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1986 - Constitution is changed to allow direct election of the president.  
Return to democracy  
1980s - Increasing shift towards high-tech and computer industry.  
1987 - President Chun pushed out of office by student unrest and international pressure 
in the build-up to the Sixth constitution. Roh Tae-woo succeeds Chun, grants greater 
degree of political liberalization and launches anti-corruption drive. 
1988 - Olympic Games in Seoul. First free parliamentary elections.  
1993 - Roh succeeded by Kim Young Sam, a former opponent of the regime and the first 
civilian president.  
1995 - Corruption and treason charges against Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-Hwan.  
South Korea admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
1998 - Kim Dae-Jung elected president of the country in the middle of an intense 
economic crisis   
Source: BBC News. South Korea’s political chronology 
 
7.3 The speculative attack against the Thai Baht. 
 
There were two ways used in order to carry out the speculative attack against the Thai 
Baht: the spot market and the forward market. 
An attack in the spot market was implemented by selling the Thai currency for US dollars. 
The main responsible were foreign investors. 
The main purpose of this attack was to devaluate the currency by pushing the value of 
the Baht in the spot market or to push up the swap premium. With this initiative they 
would be able to repay contracts with cheaper currency, therefore they were making 
huge profits. 
There were alternative ways of speculating with the currency: investors would bet against 
the baht by performing contracts with traders who would give US $ in return for an agreed 
amount of baht after some months. If the baht depreciates, the speculators made 
enormous profits, because they could repay the deals with cheaper baht.  
When the baht was heavily attacked, deteriorated further by capital outflow, the Bank of 
Thailand was forced to intervene directly in the spot market. The BOT had a currency 
peg: the baht would deviate maximum two satang from the fixed exchange rate. 
The Exchange Equalization Fund, is able to buy or sell US dollars without limit. But in 
almost all the time in 1997, it was draught to sell out the US dollar to support the value 
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of the Baht at a fixed rate. By doing so, it depleted the country's foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Without the BOT’s intervention, the baht would have debilitated considerably and the 
short-term interest rates would have increased uncontrolled because the speculative 
attacks would have dry up liquidity in the money market. 
By May 14th, 1997 an attack against the Baht was executed. The exchange rate then 
was Bt25/ US$ 1. A baht attack for US$10 billion was accomplished, which implies that 
approximately Bt260 billion disappeared from the economic system. There was only Bt 
400 billion in circulation at that time, hence it could have been the havoc of the payment 
system. 
During the speculative attacks, which straight away bind the liquidity market, the Banking 
Department "sterilized" the contractionary effect from the speculative attacks by boosting 
the baht back into the system through the buy-sell swap contracts. Through this policy 
(buy dollar/sell baht, with an obligation afterward to sell dollar/buy baht), the BOK drove 
the dollar into its account and sent the baht into the system. 
Contractually, the Bank of Thailand was obliged to hand the dollar back to the contractual 
parties and get the baht returned. The share for such deal is called a swap premium, or 
risk premium. 
  
7.4 Structural Reform Measures 
Initial program: December 1997 
 Trade Liberalization 
A timetable will be set in line with World Trade Organization commitments to eliminate 
trade-related subsidies, restrictive import licensing, and the import diversification 
program. Steps will be taken to streamline and improve the transparency of import 
certification procedures.  
 Capital Account Liberalization  
Foreign financial institutions will be allowed to participate in mergers and acquisitions of 
domestic financial institutions in a friendly manner and on equal footing. By mid-1998, 
foreign financial institutions will be allowed to establish bank subsidiaries and broker-age 
houses. Legislation will be submitted to the first special session of the National Assembly 
to harmonize the regime on equity purchases with OECD practice. The ceiling on 
aggregate foreign ownership of listed Korean shares will be increased from 26 to 50 
percent by end-1997 and to 55 percent by end-1998. The ceiling on individual foreign 
ownership will be increased from 7 to 50 percent by end-1997. By end-February 1998, 
other capital account transactions will be liberalized by easing foreigners’ access to 
domestic money market instruments and the corporate bond market and  simplifying the 
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approval procedure for foreign direct investment. A timetable will be set by end-February 
1998 to eliminate restrictions on foreign borrowing by corporations. 
 
 Corporate Restructuring 
Corporate balance sheet transparency will be improved by enforcing accounting 
standards in line with generally accepted accounting practices. The commercial 
orientation of bank lending will be fully respected and the Government will not intervene 
in bank management and lending decisions. To strengthen market discipline, bankruptcy 
laws will be allowed to operate without Government interference. 
The “real name” system in financial transactions will be maintained, although with 
possible revisions. By late 1998, the restructuring of corporate finances will be 
encouraged by, among others, reducing the high debt-to-equity ratio of corporations and 
changing the system of cross-guarantees within conglomerates. 
 Financial Sector Restructuring 
Legislation will be enacted to set up a strong and independent supervisory agency, (ii) 
strengthen and consolidate prudential supervision, and increase transparency. 
Time-bound action plans will ensure that there will be an orderly exit of nonviable 
institutions, procedures and policies to deal with weak but viable financial institutions, 
and measures to improve the commercial orientation and risk management of the 
financial sector. 
The National Assembly should pass the following: 
• A revised Bank of Korea Act, providing for central bank independence, with price 
stability as its main mandate. 
• A bill to consolidate supervision of all banks, merchant banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies into one agency with operational and financial autonomy. 
• A bill requiring that corporate financial statements be prepared on a consolidated basis 
and certified by external auditors. 
Troubled financial institutions will be restructured and recapitalized within a specified 
time frame. The exit strategy will require troubled institutions to present a viable 
rehabilitation plan and close insolvent financial institutions and those failing to carry out 
their rehabilitation plans within specified periods. 
Domestic and foreign institutions may engage in mergers and acquisitions. A timetable 
will be set for all banks to meet or exceed Basle standards. 
All forms of assistance to banks, including that coursed through the Korean Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO) and deposit insurance funds, will be provided only 
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as part of viable rehabilitation plans. Blanket guarantees will be phased out and replaced 
by a limited deposit insurance scheme. 
Merchant Banks 
The foreign exchange operations of nine technically insolvent merchant banks will be 
transferred to other institutions. (The banks were suspended on 2 December 1997, with 
depositors fully protected.) 
The consolidated deposit insurance corporation will issue bonds to raise the funds 
needed to meet the deposit insurance obligation. The Government will guarantee these 
bonds and bear the interest costs. The Government announced that it would propose 
amendments of laws to allow foreign financial institutions to participate in mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic financial institutions. Foreign participation in merchant banks is 
allowed up to 100 percent. 
The Government did the following: 
• It immediately placed the nine suspended merchant banks under the control of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and required each to submit a rehabilitation 
plan within 30 days. 
If MOFE fails to approve such plan, the institution will have its license revoked and will 
not be eligible to participate in the KAMCO program of bad-asset purchase or receive 
any financing from the deposit insurance fund. 
• It monitored the banks’ rehabilitation in close consultation with IMF. If the head of the 
supervisory authority concludes that rehabilitation has not been successful within three 
months, the institution will be closed. 
• It required the remaining merchant banks to present by 31 December 1997 a program 
of recapitalization or downsizing that will allow them 26 to meet at least a 4 percent 
capital requirement ratio by 31 March 1998, 6 percent by 30 June 1998, and 8 percent 
by June 1999. Failure to obtain supervisory approval of the program or to meet the 
schedule will lead to suspension of their foreign exchange business and possibly 
revocation of their license. 
• It required the two distressed commercial banks to prepare a plan to meet the Basle 
capital standard within four months after approval of the plan. It required other 
commercial banks to make full provisioning for their impaired assets and for their 
securities losses by end-March 1998. The banks will agree on a timetable with the 
supervisory authority by June 1998 to achieve current minimum capital standards within 
a time frame of six months to two years. 
• It required that the rehabilitation plans submitted by financial institutions to supervisory 
authorities should specify the sources and amounts of new capital, a clear schedule to 
meet Basle capital adequacy standards and provisioning requirements, and confirmation 
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from the supplier of funds; indicate changes in management and ownership; and present 
a business plan. 
The Government proposes to do the following: 
• In consultation with IMF, it will prepare a comprehensive action program to strengthen 
financial supervision and regulation in accordance with international best-practice 
standards. 
• It will subject specialized banks and development institutions to the same prudential 
standards that apply to commercial banks and require external audit on their financial 
statements. 
• It will closely monitor Korean banks’ overseas branches’ borrowing and lending 
activities to ensure that they are sound. New injections of foreign exchange by BOK to 
Korean commercial banks or their overseas branches will carry a penalty rate of 400 
basis points above the London interbank offered rate. BOK’s deposits with nonresident 
branches and affiliates of domestic financial institutions will not be increased after 
December 1997, but will be reduced gradually as soon as circumstances permit.  
• It will adjust the ceiling on net domestic assets and the indicative limit on reserve money 
to comply with required reserve ratios. 
 
Source : (Cho) 
 
 
 
 
